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Dialogue 3

-----------------Editorial,_ _ _ __

Once upon a midnight dreary,
while I pondered, weak and weary,
Over many a quaint and curious volume of
forgotten loreWhile I nodded, nearly napping,
suddenly there came a tapping
As of someone gently rapping,
rapping at the Dialogue door.
"Tis someone from SVS," I muttered
"tapping at my office door-only this and
nothing more."
Thus, it was, however, that I, perusing dusty
old copies of Dialogue, found the ghost of Ray
Vannevermore, one of the original founders of
Dialogue in the late 60s, waiting at my office door
dressed in a pale yellow and green glowing plaid
sport coat and holding a strangely sweet-smelling
:cigarette. Like Horatio I cried "Stay illusion! If
thou has any sound or use of voice speak to me: if
there be any good thing to be done that may to
thee do ease and grace to me speak to me!"
Taking one last puff on his cigarette, he handed it
to me and settling back in a chair, began to
speak. This interview is the result.
Q: I am the spirit of Dia/ague's past, Ray
Vannevermore, come to haunt the present. I am
a spirit of the 60s; who are you?
A: I am just the editor.
Q: The editor! Editor of my child?
A: Dialogue?
Q: Yes! My poor orphaned child.
A: But why so ghostly?
Q: I was murdered ... a foul business. Let's just
say foul business did me in.
A: And you've come to get revenge on your
murderers?
Q: Yes, I've come to ask you to avenge me.
A: Me?
Q: Yes, can you tell me the purpose of Dialogue
in twenty-five words or less?
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A: Well. . .Yes, this.
Q: This what?
A: This-what we're doing.
Q : You mean talking.
A: Yes, talking, and writing, and drawing.
Q: What! No sparkling Platonic forms, no
counterculture ideals to strive for? Aren't you
one of the elite of Calvin College?
A: Whenever I· think that, I think again. I consider that just yesterday I bought a purple shirt at
a thrift store for a dollar. Today I went to church
with everyone else and then played -three-onthree football with a six-year-old named Derek. I
just drank a cup of hot chocolate, and now I have
to go to the bathroom.
Q : You aren't using this magazine as a last refuge
for the arts at Calvin, the last unadulterated
bastion against bourgeoisie materialism?
A: No. On the other hand, I won't sacrifice
quality. "Elite" is a loaded word. Elitists are those
who use jargon and artificial distinctions to
elevate themselves, while the truly elite make
themselves understandable to everyone.
Q : Then you're receptive to the new age we're
living in?
A: I want to be relevant to 1987 without being
controlled by it. Chimes is here to address
campus issues. The Grand Rapids Press has its
"Flair" section. Dialogue is for broader, more
thoughtful perspectives: those with a past,
present, and future. These are in a sense timeless.
Q : Heavy. How does this question strike you?
Can you tell me what you consider to be the
purpose of art in the 20th century, in, say, 25
words or less. (I have a sunrise to beat.)
A: No.
Q : How about 50?
A: No.
Q : .How ...

A: ... but it's a good question. Many in the 20th
century claim that art is totally objective. Art can
only describe what is; the artist tells what
happens and lets the viewer reach his own conclusions. On the other hand, there are those like
Tolstoy who say art must be moral as well.
Novelist John Gardner says that "art today
ought to stop snivelling, go for the answers, or
shut up." He thinks art has an edifying purpose,
that it should teach morality.
A: And where do you. stand?
A: I'm-as any Christian-ambivalent. The
Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard describes us both as seekers and apostles. Seekers
because we are students trying to distill the truth.
from our experiences, and apostles because as
Christians we-in a paradoxical sense-already
have the Truth. Too much apostleship and one
becomes dry and didactic, too much seeking and
one forgets how to sa~ to another, "This is the
Truth that will set you free."
Q: Heavy. Heavy. This Kierkegaard reminds me
of Brautigan.
A: He also describes something he calls the three
spheres of existence. The lowest sphere, the
aesthetic, is covered by the ethical sphere, which
in turn is covered by the religious sphere. I feel
this is an analogy for Dialogue. We publish the .
purely aesthetic-like the artwork of Tom
Bryant, but also the ethical exploration of Eric
Jekkals into Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, and
finally the religious meditation of Lisa
Van Houten. The religious sphere, because it is
the highest, sinks into and nourishes the others
like water into soil.
Q: Sounds like Dooyeweerdian spheres.
A: Let's not juggle metaphors.
Q: What sort of things are going into Dialogue
this year?
A: The best writing, the best artwork that I can
find, the best stuff sent to me here at the
Dialogue office in the Commons Annex. Fiction,

poetry, essays, art, photography, meditations,
responses to earlier issues, new genres. I'm open
to anything.
Q: But isn't that sort of broad? Aren't you
addressing issues like nuclear disarmament or
destruction of the environment?
A: Yes, the good of technology vs. the bad.
Q: ... or black and women's rights?
A: Yes, women's equality vs. women's
stereotypes.
Q: ... or the bourgeosie oppression of the students by the faculty?
A: Yes, academic freedom vs. academic rigor.
Q: ... or the spiritual wasteland on campus?
A: Yes, Christianity vs. Christendom.
Q: . .. or where the world we're going?
A: Yes, the future of Calvin College.
Q: And you want biting criticism ...
A: . . . as well as clear-headed argument and
heartfelt praise.
Q: Why are you agreeing with me so much?
A: Maybe I do.
Q: I think something is rotten in Denmark. Are
you going to help me get revenge on my
murderers or not?
A: Maybe I won't.
Q: Is that all you have to say? Can't you be more
decisive than that?
A: Yes. Keep reading.
(With that the ghost vanished in a fit of croaking
"Nevermore!")

-MJR
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English is the cruellest class, forcing
Writing from a dead mind, mixing
Grammar and insight, stirring
Dull brains with strange poems.
Calculus kept us sane, hiding
Inspiration in kind equations, supporting
A little self-confidence with truly right answers
Exams surprised us, and we went
And drank coffee, and studied for some hours.
lch bin, du bist, er sie, es ist; ja, echt deutsch.
When we were children, it wasn't as bad as this.
We went sledding instead, when the snow came.
Now I study much of the night, and sleep
Whenever I can.
Unreal life,
Through the thick snow of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over trodden paths
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled
As all flowed through the doors into the coffee-shop
Where minutes clicked past upon the clocks
With a dead sound on the click of twenty past ten.;
I had not thought life had undone so many.

II
"My nerves are bad tonight. Yes, bad.
"I should not have had that coffee. I should not have drunk that final cup.
"I do not know what to write. Keep thinking. Think."
I think we are in rat's alley
Where the dead men lost their minds
"What is that book?"
The Wind in the Willows."
"What is that book? And that? What has happened to my Eliot?"
Nothing again nothing.
"Do
"You know anything? Do you see nothing? Do you remember
"Nothing?"
I remember
You put it there before you left for class.
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Ill
Unreal life
Into the darkness of a winter night
The violet hour, when most eyes turn
Upwards from the desk, when most put down their work
I, though half blind with reading,
At the violet hour, the evening hour that strives
Homeward, brings the worker home from work
I continue, on into the night
I, too, await the expected stroke of one
When my work is only just begun.

IV

Phlebas the Phoenician, a fortnight dead,
Forgot that he could ever read, or write,
Rode peacefully on the deep-sea swell,
Looked up into the gentle stars, the night
One sad dolphin cushioning his head.
Student or scholar, you who read reviews,
You who turn the wheel and look to windward.
Look the other way, and you may see
Upon the waves
Phlebas, who once tried as hard as you.
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V
"On T . S. Eliot
I can connect
Nothing with nothing.
My teacher terrible teacher who misses
Nothing."
la la
My eyes were sunken, and with limp eyelids
I waited for class, while sleep's black clouds
Gathered in my mind. Then the terrible voice
"You must give. You must give
"Your sources. Why have you not given
"Your sources?
"How can I sympathize with you
"If you do not give your sources?"
"And have you no control
"Over the structure of your paragraphs?"
I could not
Speak, as my eyes ·failed. I was neither
Living nor dead, aQd I said nothing.
I sat upon my bed,
Thinking, the arid 11me behind me.
Should I at least put my books in order?
Sleep was sudden, God-given
And my breath came calmly once again.
Shantih
shantih
shantih

- Chris Wolterstorff
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Laura R. H erder

The Moral of The Rime
by Eric Jekkals
In response to a charge by Mrs. Barbauld that
the Rime of the Ancient Mariner "had no moral,"
Coleridge is reputed to have said:
... in my own judgment the poem had too
much; and that the only, or chief fault, if I
may say so, was the obtrusion of the moral
sentiment so openly on the reader as a
principle or cause of action in a work of
such pure imagination. It ought to have had
no more moral than the Arabian Nights tale
of the merchant's sitting down to eat dates
by the side of a well, and throwing the shells
aside, and lo! a genie starts up, and says he
must kill the aforesaid merchant because
one of the date shells had, it seems, put out
the eye of the genie's son. (Table Talk, 1835,
in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner: A
Handbook, edited by Royal A. Gettmann .
San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1961, 66-67.)
The conclusion some want us to draw from
this is that Coleridge had no moral intention in
the poem, or further, that whatever is there is not
Coleridge's own and cannot be taken seriously.
The value of the poem, it is argued, may be
literary or psychological, but any moral or religious overtones are only devices to accomplish
those ends.
Another possibility, however, is that the moral
sentiment conveyed in the Rime was intentional
and was Coleridge's own; his regret was only that
it ought not to have obtruded so openly on the
reader: that it should have been conveyed less
explicitly, but conveyed nonetheless. I shall
argue that based on what we know about
Coleridge, and on evidence from the poem itself,
this explanation is the correct one.
The moral sentiment in question is presumably
summarized in lines 612-17 of the Rime:
He prayeth well, who loueth well
Both man and bird and beast.
He prayeth best, who louest best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loueth us,
He made and loueth all.
By contrast, the passage in the Arabian Nights
alluded to by Coleridge is certainly not the moral

message of that tale. But, as Humphrey House
points out (The Ancient Mariner, Gettman), that
the Arabian tale does have a moral is hardly disputable-it is just that the moral isn't summarized in a neat little maxim. It is certainly
posssible, then, that what Coleridge was said to
have regretted in Table Talk was not that the
Rime contained a moral sentiment, but that the
sentiment was distilled into an explicit six-line
statement.
In considering the truth of this hypothesis we
must first reckon with Coleridge's claim
(Gettman, p. 43) that the Rime was originally
written instead of the Wanderings of Cain (which
was written at a later date). Because both these
stories share the theme of sin, guilt and expiation, it seems likely that Coleridge had a moral
point in mind when he wrote the Rime. Furthermore, Coleridge's philosophy of poetry itself recommends this hypothesis. In the Preface to
Lyrical Ballads (these ballads being the set of
works to which the Rime originally belonged),
Wordsworth states that "Poetry is the image of
man and Nature." (From the Norton Anthology
of English Literature, Vol. 2, Fifth Edition, W.W.
Norton and Co., 1986, p. 165) Coleridge, in the
Biographical Literaria (Gettman, p. 42) writes,
"During the first year that Mr. Wordsworth and I
were neighbors, our conversations turned frequently on the two cardinal points of poetry, the
power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a
faithful adherence to the truth of nature, and the
power of giving the interest of novelty by modifying the colors of imagination." Since Coleridge
was so concerned about presenting the truth of
reality in his poems, and because virtually everything we know about Coleridge suggests that he
felt moral truth to be a very important aspect of
reality, it looks as if the burden of proof falls on
those who want us to believe that it is impossible
to take the moral of the Rime seriously enough to
demonstrate from the poem itself that this is the
case. Unless such evidence can be supplied, we
are not justified in believing that Coleridge had no
moral intent in the Rime.
Perhaps the most common objection to taking
the moral of the Rime seriously is the apparent
disproportion between the Mariner's "crime"
and the consequences it brings:" ... because the
Mariner has shot a bird, four times fifty sailors
Dialogue 11

drop down dead and the slayer himself is doomed
to an endless life" (John Livingston Lowes, from
Gettman, p. 67). Indeed, this is a reasonable objection, but only so long as the Mariner's crime is
merely that he shot a bird. Similarly, the Genesis
account of the Fall would be a sore affront to our
sense of justice if Adam's and Eve's offense was
simply that they ate an apple. The Scriptures indicate, however, that Adam and Eve's appleeating was only an outward manifestation of a
much more serious kind of act-one for which
they deserved every bit of what they got. It
makes sense then, to consider whether or not
the Mariner's shooting of the Albatross was
meant to signify something deeper.
Actually, it is rather hard to read the Rime
without getting the impression that the Albatross
was meant to be, in some sense, a Christ-figure. I
am told that an albatross in flight has a cruciform
appearance, and the albatross in this poem was
hailed "in God's name," "as if it were a Christian
soul." It also "ate the food it ne'er had eat"-the
same can be said of Christ during his time on
earth-and "perched for vespers nine." The
Mariner shot the Albatross with a crossbow, and
was made to wear the dead bird suspended from
his neck "Instead of the cross." One of the spiritvoices tells us that the Albatross was "harmless"
and that it
... loved the man
who shot him with his bow.
reminding the reader of Christ's love for his
executioners. Additionally, the spirit-voice
begins his little speech with the words: "By him
who died on cross."
In view of all this, it seems that the Mariner in
the Rime was guilty of killing more than an
ordinary bird. In fact, he was guilty of killing
Christ. If anyone thinks this is stretching things, I
refer him to Coleridge's own words in Notes on
Pilgrim's Progress concerning the meaning of the
crucifixion:
Alas! How many Protestants make a
mental idol of the cross scarcely less injurious to the true faith than the wooden
crosses and crucifixes of the Romanists!
And this because they have not been taught
that Jesus was both the Christ and the
great symbol of Christ. Strange, that we
can explain spiritually what to take up the
cross of Christ, to be crucified with Christ
means; yet never ask what the crucifixion
itself signifies, but rest satisfied in the
historic image. That one declaration of the
Apostles, that by willful sin we crucify the
Son of God afresh, might have roused us to
nobler thoughts. (From Owen Barfield,
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What Coleridge Thought, Middletown,
1971, p. 157.)
When the Mariner's killing of the Albatross is
seen in this light, as an act of willful sin, his subsequent suffering ceases to seem so ridiculous,
and the poem's sin-expiation motif gains considerable plausibility.
But not enough plausibility, according to
some. Critics beginning as early as Wordsworth
have bemoaned the fact that the Mariner doesn't
really do anything by his own initiative other than
bite his arm. He blesses the water-snakes, but
this is done "unawares." As for shooting the
albatross, we are not offered any motive that
could have possibly inclined him to do such a
thing. Thus, as George Watson concludes, the
poem has little value as a Christian parable because "The Mariner is simply not felt to be
morally responsible" (Coleridge the Poet,
London 1966 p. 97). This conclusion, however,
'
.
. 's
betrays 'a considerable
ignorance
of Coleridge
beliefs about human moral responsibility.
For Coleridge, will is the fundamental ground
of personality and individuality. Thus, God exists
as the Absolute Will, which exists in a relationship of complete identity with His reason, the
Universal Reason. Man exists as a finite will,
whose proper activity is \:o conform itself reasonably to the Absolute Will. However, the relation of man's will to his reason is not one of
identity, as is God's, but only of a possible
synthesis. Herein lies free will and the possibility
for sin. For, as Barth explains Coleridge's doctrine as set forth in the Opus Maximum:
... it is the nature of the will to assert its own
individual existence. But it must do so
honestly, that is, according to its own
nature. The nature of finite will is to be an
image of the Absolute Will. If, however, the
finite will asserts its own individuality for its
own self-realization alone, "under the predominance of the particular," instead of
willing the particular "solely as the glory
and representation of the plentitude of the
universal," then it becomes a "separated
finite." To do so is to contradict one's own
being. To do so is to bring moral evil, sin into
the world. (Coleridge and Christian
Doctrine, Harvard, 1969, p. 111.)
In the Mariner's shooting of the Albatross, we
find precisely the sort of wanton, unreasonable,
self-asserting act that exemplifies what Coleridge
understood Original Sin to be, that is, "an evil
which has its ground or origin in the agent, and
not in the compulsion of circumstances" (Aids to
Reflection, from Gettman, p. 65). This is the kind
of sin that crucifies "the Son of God afresh." The

fact that we are not offered a motive for the
Mariner's act should not cause us to feel him to
be morally unresponsible; that there was no
"compulsion of circumstances" assures us that
killing the harmless, friendly Albatross was an act
of pure self-will on the part of the Mariner.
Furthermore, it is not at all surprising that'
Coleridge chose for the symbolic sin of this poem
the killing of a seabird rather than a more
conventionally serious crime such as, ·say,
shooting an old lady. If the Mariner had shot an
old lady, we would have been too repulsed to
understand the moral point Coleridge was trying
to make, viz., that any particular act willed for
purposes of self-realization rather than "solely as
the glory and representation of the plenitude of
the universal" is a damnable sin.
The Mariner's shipmates, as the gloss informs
us, justify his act and thereby share his guilt.
They, however, get off easy-they simply die.
The· Mariner, on the other hand, must continue
living and begins to experience the alienation
which is not an arbitrary punishment for, but a
logical consequence of, the self-contradictory act
he has performed. In short, he begins to experience Hell itself, the state where "nothing of
vice remains but i'ts guilt and its misery-vice
must be misery itself; all and utter misery" (Aids
to Reflection, from Barth, p. 192). It is interesting
that the Mariner facilitates the infliction of
punishment on himself and his crew by his only
other self-initiated act, that of biting his arm and
sucking his blood so he can cry out. As soon as
he does this, those indesirable personages 1
Death and Life-in-Death, stop tacking and head
straight for the Mariner's ship. The poor Mariner
can't do anything right.
But that he can't do anything right makes
sense in light of Coleridge's belief that the human
will is corrupt and cannot by its own efforts save
itself. Thus, it is also fitting that the beginning of
the Mariner's redemption from hell-his love for
the water-snakes-is something that seemed to
be visited upon him from above:
Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
And I blessed them unaware.
For, as Coleridge wrote in 1814, "From all
experience as well as a priori from the constitution of the human soul I gather that without a
miraculous Intervention of Omnipotence the
Punishment must continue as long as the soulwhich I believe imperishable" (from Barth, p.
193).
Furthermore, it is fitting that the Mariner's
redemption began with an act of love. Love, for
Coleridge, represents a reversal of the selfcontradictory and alienating act of asserting
one's self-will. "It is an act of will," says

Lockridge, "that, extraordinarily, would subvert
the will's own drive toward separateness"
(Coleridge the Moralist, New York, 1977, p. 193).
"It promises to redress the evil tendency of will to
establish an independent base and, in so doing,
would free the moral eye of its 'film'" (Lockridge,
p. 184). This is what the Mariner, "whose eye is
bright" has learned-though much penance
remains for him to do.
There is one more objection to be met,
however, which Watson construes as follows:
The Mariner's moral,"'He prayeth best who
love th best. .. "is not depressing or even discouraging, and not, in itself, out of keeping
with the mood of a wedding celebration.
But the wedding guest, on hearing it, simply
cannot face the party; "He went like one
that hath been stunned" and he wakes -up
the next morning "sadder and wiser .... "If
the story is saddening, which it is, and its
stated moral is not, then the moral can
hardly fit the story.
Now it is true that the stated moral of the Rime is
not saddening, but it is not for this reason unable
the story. Sad stories do not have to have sad
morals-how can a moral, in itself, be
"saddening" anyhow? Only stories (or real-life
experiences) can be sad. Which is exactly the
case with the Rime of the Ancient Mariner: the
Mariner has learned a most important lessonbut at a great price. He was an ordinary man
who had an extraordinary encounter with
supernatural reality, through which he was able
to experience the logical consequences of sin to a
degree that other people, during their earthly
lives, never do . As a result, he has attained to a
degree of moral awareness-an awareness of the
principle behind all moral imperatives-which far
exceeds that of most men, and makes him
somewhat eccentric, to say the least. But as
often as "That agony returns" and he is ·
compelled to hypnotize some innocent
bystander and tell them his tale, something of the
moral awareness gets passed on, and the hearer
becomes sadder and wiser. It makes sense that
the Wedding Guest turns away from the
wedding: the kind of truth he has glimpsed is the
sort that touches the core of one's being and
disturbs everyday patterns of thinking.
Thus, the moral stands: "He prayeth best, who
lovest best." Perhaps Coleridge was right that an
epigram like this does not belong in "a work of
such pure imagination" (although it would be a
pity if these words had never been written). But
to say that Coleridge had no moral intent in the
Rime of the Ancient Mariner is to ignore a great
deal of evidence to the contrary.
Dialogue 13

Mendel and the Chicken
by Heather Bouman
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Mendel and I and my older brother Michael
walked home from school together every day.
We were next-door-neighbors to Mendel. That
day was just warm enough to tell us it was spring,
but not warm enough for us to believe it. The air
was a little bit damp and had a cushioned feel to
it.
"He's tough," Mendel said. "I've seen him.
He's little, but he's tough." He walked his bike as
Michael and I walked on either side of him, a
backpack on each back.
"You mean that new little kid in your class. the really little one?" Michael, a 7th-grader, was a
year older than Mendel and I, and he liked us to
remember that sometimes. But this time he was
right.
"Yeah," Mendel said. "I bet he's even smaller
than you, Glory."
"Boy, he must really be wimpy, then." Michael
laughed.
"Oh, shuttup."
"He's not wimpy, though. He's really tough. I
watched him-during gym class."
"Really?" Michael turned on me. ''Did you see
him?"
"No. Us girls were doing tumbling."
"And the guys?"
Mendel answered. "Weight lifting. And
Duane-that's his name-could lift more than
anyone." He was about to go on, but I stopped
him .
"What about Chicken?"
"What about Chicken?"
"Did Duane lift more than Chicken?"
"Chicken wasn't in the gym today. He-had a
stomach ache."
I laughed. Michael turned to stare at me, and
then he started laughing, too. I laughed and
laughed, and then I couldn't stand up, and fell to
my knees on the sidewalk. I couldn't breathe
except in gasps. My stomach hurt. And I had to
go to the bathroom. Michael fell back on the
grass between the sidewalk and the road and
laughed to the clouds in the sky. Mendel held on
to his black three-speed and watched us laugh.
He laughed a little, too, but mostly he watched.
Slowly everything calmed down. I rubbed my
stomach with one hand and my jaw with the
other. Michael sat up, and I hiccoughed. Then
Mendel said, smoothly-he had a way of talking
that was like melted butter on toast-"Maybe it
was something he ate." And Michael and I
started laughing all over again.
Maybe I should explain. Chicken is the fattest
boy in the whole school. Even his hair is fat. It's a
thick, unruly, Dutch blond.
Privately, we kids call him Chicken, not be-

cause he is one, but because last year at our
church picnic, Mendel and Michael and I saw him
eat a whole one, roasted. Since then, the name
stuck. But his real name is Luke.
We tease him a lot, but sometimes he seems to
ask for it. On the last day of fifth grade, he leaned
on his desk, and the metal support bent under his
weight. Our teacher had to call the janitor to fix it.
And he always brings a big plastic bag for his
lunch-it won't fit into a regular brown paper
sack. And he keeps candy bars from home in his
desk and eats them when the teacher isn't looking. He broke two swings on the playground before he even reached fourth grade. Chicken is
just plain huge.
It wasn't any surprise to us that he had gotten
out of gym class. He usually did-he didn't like
exercise, and the gym teacher didn't really like
him much, either.
What was surprising was that the new kid was
so strong. "You think Duane could beat up
Chicken?" Michael asked. We had finished
laughing and started talking again.
"Of course, not!" I said. "No one could beat
Chicken up. He's too big."
"I wasn't asking you. " He turned to Mendel.
Mendel unzipped his navy blue jacket slowly,
until it was exactly half open and half zipped. "I
think so." He looked at me. "I think Duane could
beat Chicken."
A last little hiccough from laughing bubbled
up, and then I said, "No way, Men-dell." I drew
his name out. I knew he didn't like his name very
much. "All he'd have to do is sit on Duane, and
Duane would be squished. He wouldn't have a
chance."
"I think Duane would win."
"No way!"
He zipped his jacket three-fourths up just as
the breeze began to turn into wind. I shivered.
"You wanna bet?" he said, grinning.
"Okay-a dollar."
Michael started to say something, but coughed
instead.
"A dollar? You must be afraid you're going to
lose."
"I am not-"
"Two dollars. "
"Glory-" Michael said.
"Two dollars," I agreed. We shook hands.
Michael glared at me.
Mendel swung his leg over his bike as if he were
getting on a black horse . "All we have to do now
is get them to fight. " He adjusted his red backpack and started pedaling, calling back to us:
"I'm not going home yet-I have a piano lesson
now." His words got softer and softer until they
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melted into the pillows in the air.
Michael turned to me. "If mom finds out you're
gambling, she'll kill you." His eyes were the color
of the sky right before a big rain.
I swung my backpack through the air, watching its blue against the blue of the sky. My backpack, unlike Michael's was light and swung
easily. "It's not gambling if I know I'm going to
. "
wm.
He snorted. "Good luck."
Michael turned off at the next corner. I called
after him. "Where are you going?"
"I'm taking the back way."
"Oh."
"Don't follow me."
"Don't worry-I don't want to."
"Good."
I walked home slowly, alone. We live only
about half a mile from school, on Centennial
Street, the oldest street in town. The school is on
one side of town and our little, black-and-white
house is on the other.
When I got home, Michael was lying on the
sofa, watching an ABC After School Special rerun. My mom had left a note to please take some
hamburger out of the freezer, but Michael hadn't
done it. He hadn't set the table or folded the
laundry from the dryer, either.
He didn't even look away from the TV when I
asked him about it. "That's women's work."
"What?"
"I said, that's women's-"
"I heard you the first time. Look at this note.
Does this note say 'Dear Gloria' on it? No! It says
'Dear Gloria and Michael.' That means both of
us. Together." I waved the note in his face.
He didn't even look at the note. "I know what it
says."
"Then do it! -I'll call Mom!"
He half-sat up and slowly pulled his tennis
shoes off. "Listen. I'm the man of the house. I
mow the lawn. I shovel the driveway-"
"We didn't even get any snow this winter! And
you only mow the lawn once a week. I think you
can handle a little more work."
"Did you ever mow the lawn?" He sat up all the
way.
I crumpled the note and looked at it. My hands
were moist and had blurred the ink. 'Dear Gloria
and Michael' was smeared, and it ran together
into one long word. "No, I didn't. - But I would if
Mom would let me."
"You would not. Besides, she won't let you
anyway. That's the man's job."
"Since when? And since when are you a man?
Mike-"
"Michael."
"Mike. I'm going to call mom if you don't help
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me." He shrugged and started watching TV
again.
I was angry. Michael made me so an£ry. I
kicked the sofa cushion right under his head, but
he didn't even move. So I went over and turned
the TV set off. And then I left the room, dropping
the note in the wastebasket on the way out. I
heard him get up and turn the TV back on after I
left.
I put the hamburger on the counter, folded all
the laundry except Michael's and set the table for
two places-mine and my mom's. Then I went up
to my room and half-read a book.
When my mom came home, she made Micheal
fold his clothes and set his place. "And next time,
do it right away." Michael wouldn't talk to me the
rest of the night. So I read my book again until I
fell asleep.
The next day was so hot it seemed like spring
had decided not to come at all and had sent
,summer to take her place. I thought about
wearing a dress-we weren't allowed to wear
shorts to school, and a dress would be cooler
than jeans. But if I did, I wouldn't be able to play
kickball with Mendel and some of the other guys.
Most of the boys played baseball, but Mendel and
I and a few others played kickball during recess.
Chicken usually watched us, sitting on the dirt on
the edge of the field, leaning his back against the
fence, eating. He took so long to eat, he never
had time to play.
Mendel asked the new kid, Duane, to play. He
was on our team. He was good-he didn't talk
much, but he could really kick.
Chicken liked him. When he came up to bat
the second time, he said, "You're doing real
good, Duane. Real good." He nodded. All his
chins nodded.
"Thanks," Duane said. He was walking with
Mendel. I was walking behind them, wondering
why Mendel wasn't walking with me like he
always did.
Chicken nodded again. "You're good, all
right." He reached into his bag. "Here, you want
some chips?" He held them out, smiling. I caught
up with Mendel and Duane.
"No thanks," said Duane. He didn't look at
Chicken-only at his chins. He seemed
fascinated and horrified, hypnotized. Then he
walked past Chicken and followed Mendel to the
spot where we batted, only a little way from
Chicken. "Holy shit," Duane said. It sounded like
his mouth swore by accident, apart from the rest
of his body. "He's so fat, it's gross. It's really
gross."
I turned to see Chicken. He had heard. We all
had heard. We poked fun of Chicken, of course,
but we never swore about him. And we never

said he was gross. Chicken put the chips back in
his yellow plastic bag and stood up. His mouth
drooped. His chins drooped. Then he walked
away, back into the school. When lunch recess
was over, he sat in his seat like a big stone. He
didn't raise his hand in class or talk to anyone or
eat food when the teacher was turned around.
And he didn't come out to the kickball field at last
recess-he stayed inside with a heada~he.
Mendel ran outside with Duane at last recess,
and they beat everyone else to the field. I was
right behind them. I was really hot. My skin was
sticky, and I knew that if I could only peel it off, I
would be cool. I wished I had worn my little sundress. But then I couldn't play with Mendel.
So we played kickball, and my hair stuck to my
neck in curly little clumps.
Mendel didn't walk home with us-he went
home with Duane. They were going to play with
Duane's computer. He didn't ask me to come. I
walked home with Michael, and when he asked
me if Chicken and Duane had their fight yet, I
said no. I didn't think they were going to, either.
Then Michael lipped his lips and said, "I think I'll
tell Mom about the bet."
I kicked him in the shin. He went home the
back way again.
When I got home, I put on my bathing suit and
went in the backyard and sprayed myself with the
hose. Then, when I had stopped dripping
(mostly), I went inside. Michael had set his place
at the table, so I set mine and my mom's. He had
also washed his breakfast dishes. I washed mine,
and my mom's coffee cup. Then I got the chicken
out for supper and put it on the counter to thaw.
I looked in the family room. Michael was lying
on the couch in shorts, doing his math homework. He had a little bruise already on his shin.
The fan was on, and it blew his hair back. His hair
was curly like mine, and almost as long.
I went back outside and played with the hose
until my mom came home, and made supper.
She hugged us when we came in the kitchen.
"How are my little curlyheads today?" She has
straight hair, as straight as if she irons it every
morning when she irons her blouses and skirts.
"I'm not little," Michael said. He pulled away.
"Me either," I said;
"And I thought you were my children this
morning. You grew up on me in one day?" She.
put the chicken down in front of us. Michael and I
each took a leg.
·
The next day was just as hot. I wore jeans and
the coolest shirt I could find. My mom dropped
us off at school on her way to work. Mendel was
already there with Duane. They were sitting on
the steps outside the building, sketching out
what looked like baseball strategies. I asked what

they were.
"Baseball strategies," Duane said.
"Why? We play kickball every recess," I said to
Mendel.
Mendel looked a little embarrassed. "Duane
and I want to play baseball today. You see, we
have this really great game plan."
"Oh " I said like I understood. But I didn't.
"Can I' play?" '
"No " said Duane. "We don't want any girls.
We're ~oing to win." Mendel looked down at the
strategies and studied them. I went inside and sat
at my desk and waited for school to start.
At recess and lunch I played kickball, and
Mendel and Duane played baseball. Chicken
watched me play. I could see Mendel and Duane
in the other field-it didn't look like they were
winning. Mendel wasn't very good. Duane was,
though. They came back to class laughing and
making bets with the other guys on how they
would win next time.
By afternoon recess, I was so hot I didn't want
to play kickball. So I sat by Chicken on the dirt
and watched the others. He shared a candy bar
with me. We sweated together.
Michael and Mendel and I walked home
together. Michael and Mendel walked ahead of
me·, but I took the back way and beat them both.
Then I set the table and took the hamburger out
and put it on the counter. I changed into my
bathing suit and went into the backyard and
sprayed myself with the hose. Then I turned the
hose off and looked at the grass. A whole yard full
of grass. It was wet and shiny in a circle all around
me. I turned the hose back on and sprayed the
whole backyard so that all the grass was wet, as
wet as me. The water could feed the lawn, and it
would grow to be tall and green, long and tall and
green and sparkling wet.
Then I thought, I can do it. Mom will let me. I
want to. And I turned the hose off and went back
inside.
The next day was hot again, so I wore my
sundress to school. The teacher liked it-she
said it was pretty. So did my friend Tara. She lives
a couple of blocks away from me. She's my best
friend now, even though we never used to play
together very much.
Mendel and I never finished our bet, because
Duane and Chicken never fought. Michael never
did tell on me, either. And he's glad I mow the
lawn now, because he never liked doing it. But he
still won't 'set the table unless I make him. So I
make him.
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INTERVIEW
Excuse, me, miss, what's your name?
Bessie Smith.
Where do you live?
Stiff in a shell, weeping.
What do you do?
I cry and sing; I'm a fool.
Do you have any brothers or sisters?
They're black,
but I'm alone.
Who· is your husband?
Every sonofabitch around Dark.
Can you be more specific?
I speak clear
On scratchy records.
So, what do you do?
I swallow it down with cheap Gin
But these lamentations, up they creep out.
When?
When the Ol'Town is hot
and I can't.
Why do you sing?
To let the whole world know
Whites ain't the only blacks alive.
Who are your friends?
Dark parties,
Cornet accompaniments.
When do you see them?
The first, seen aloneThe second, when I growl a mahogany moan.
Where have you been?
Through the states with
The Theatre Owner's Booking Association.
We call it TOBA.
Tough On Black Asses.
Where are you going?
Don't know. Already been where I'm going.
Heaven's hard to reach
Alcohol sucks me in with a steel straw.
How did you die?
Car accident.
My red just like yours blood
washed the road
on the way to
a denial
at a white man's hospital.
What did you see?
I stumbled on an insult
and watched the moon stagger.
Which way now?
Already been through where I'm going.
-David Jellema
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Liberty and Law:
Recovering the Lost Balance
by Ronald A. Wells
In this year of the bicentennial of the Constitution, Americans are engaging in various
celebrations of the sturdy document which has
governed our lives for two hundred years. Unlike the bicentennial of 1976, which focused
patriotic ideology, this bicentennial does not
have for most Americans a clear focus. Most
intelligent and literate people have a vague idea of
what it is we celebrate, a sort of gratitude that law
has "ordered liberty" (in John Adams' great
phrase), and that we should be grateful for political-legal reality that is the envy of most of the
world-a workable balance between the liberty
of persons and the law that guards the common
good.
Many among us, however, wonder aloud .
whether or not the balance is still workable as the
Republic begins its third century under the
Constitution. Mostly from the right, especially
the so-called "new Christian right," come criticisms of contemporary American life. The
concern is that we have drifted or fallen from the
intent of the Constitution writers. Even the
Attorney-General of the United States has said
that we should try to recover the socio-moral
understandings that undergirded the work of the
founders; in doing so we would restore the health
of the Republic. But, while much of the force in
calling for restoration comes from neoconservatives, I want to suggest that persons of other political persuasions have a stake in this too. I agree
that the United States would be a much healthier
nation if we recovered-and lived by-the set of
assumptions which energized the Founders. But,
as this article will try to show, there are many
ironies and paradoxes in assessing the meaning
of that restoration.
We can identify a constellation of views which
undergirded the work of the farmers of the
American Constitution. As Richard Hofstadter
pointed out a generation ago in a memorable
phrase, "the Constitution of the United States
was based on the philosophy of Hobbes and the
religion of Calvin." 1 While the Constitution was
not intended to be an exercise in abstract reason20 Dialogue

ing but a practical document to govern a nation,
it was nevertheless a major event in the intellectual history of the West. As Hofstadter writes,
"The men who drew up the Consitution in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 had a vivid
Calvinistic sense of human evil and damnation,
and believed with Hobbes that men are selfish
and contentious." 2 In view of the conviction that
"natural" man is oriented toward vice, the
Founders believed that a government of virtue
could emerge only when vice checked vice in a
balanced institutionalization of countervailing
forces.
James Madison, properly regarded as the
philosopher of the Constitution, explained this
view in his now-familiar Federalist, number 51:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. ... It may be a reflection on human
nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.
But what is government itself, but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would
be necessary . ... In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself.
This, surely, was not an idealistic basis on which
to found the American government. But, some
argue, won't such a strong dose of realism disillusion the idealism of Americans, especially young
people? Madison was asked the same question
by a mocking delegate at the Constitutional Convention: was he saying that "the frailties of
human nature are the proper elements of good
government?" Madison replied, "I know no
other." As Alistair Cooke has commented, "That
simple sentence, which reflects Madison's
unsleeping sense of reality and his ability to get
the Convention to set up a system that hopes for
the best in human nature, but is always on guard
against the worst, is what-I believe-has
guaranteed the survival of the Constitution as a
hardy and practical instrument of government. "3

So it would seem possible for us to identify a
fundamental aspect of the worldview of the
Founders. One supposes it could be restored if
the relatively monist, Protestant (even Calvinist)
worldview of the 18th century were reasserted.
But in our more pluralist times that does not
seem possible. While Americans are free to
accept a Calvinist worldview, those who call for a
reassertation of the "Judea-Christian heritage"
cannot realistically expect American belief and
behavior to change that radically, at least in a
deeply religious sense.
Shifting now from ideology to social behavior,
we inquire into how Americans have behaved
and do behave. Undergirding the work of the
Founders was an unspoken, but deeply felt,
conviction that there was such a thing as "the
public good," or as they often called it, "the
commonweal." While the Founders cherished
and guaranteed individual liberty, they assumed
that liberty would always be referred against
what Daniel Boorstin has called "the givens" of
the social order, based on the Protestant notion
of covenant or contract. 4 Judicially, this was
repeatedly reaffirmed during the Federal
ascendancy on the courts, especially in such
landmark cases as Marbury v. Madison,
McCulloch v. Maryland, and Gibbons v. Ogden.
What broke apart the context which formed
this unspoken consensus? The answer is
complex. A shorthand version would go
something like this: The consensus about "the
common good" (what the classically educated
called "virtue") was broken by no less than the
experience of the American people in the 19th
century-in short, the history of liberty. The
history of liberty has always been the history of
attempts to negate restraints. Freedom has
typically been seen as "freedom from," and as the
American people moved west, as they built cities,
a new ideology arose to describe their actual and
hoped-for experiences. The given of a
commonweal in an organic social order was
replaced by an ideology that was individualistic
and atomistic, which is at the heart of the mythos
of American liberalism and a central cultural
theme in American history. Stephan Thernstrom

has called this "the mobility ideology," as follows:
According to this complex of ideas,
American society was a collection of
mobile, freely competing atoms; divisions
between rich and poor could not produce
destructive social conflict because the
status rich and poor was not permanent. If
society was in a state of constant circulation, if every man had an opportunity to rise
to the top, all would be well. 5

. . the Founders believed that
a government of virtue could
emerge only when vice
checked vice.
For a time, indeed, it seemed that all might be
well in the land of the free. Powered by a
"Transportation Revolution" across the frontier,
the "common man" was supposedly liberated
during the era of Andrew Jackson. To what
extent the "common man" was actually liberated
is a matter of some doubt, but there is no doubt
that capitalism was liberated. And with the
liberation of capitalism came the rejection of the
Federalist culture (and its view of human nature),
which had given America both the Hamiltonian
financial system and the Constitution. 6
During the middle third of the 19th century,
many Americans began to wonder just where an
ever expanding liberty would lead. With fewer
and fewer common bonds, some citizens began
to object to the behavior of others, as witness the
attempts to "reform" social behavior first
through persuasion, then through attempts at
social control. The "ferment of reform" was part
of the general ferment of American society-a
society without national institutions. As Stanley
Elkins and C.S. Griffin have shown, reform was
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largely a failure in the ante-bellum period: despite
the campaign against slavery, the cotton
kingdom flourished; despite the campaign
against drink, the whiskey flowed; despite the
campaign against Catholic immigration, Ireland
and Germany gave forth their huddled masses.
Reform was a failure precisely because a society
dedicated to liberty had no core values upon
which all citizens could rely. The frustration and
anger of reformers and those resisting their
attempted controls resulted in social violence in
the growing cities and, finally Civil War itself.
While it is difficult to assign precisely a time
when America became a "modern" society,
surely after the Civil War Americans felt the
pressures of modernity more deeply. As the
nation began its second century,
industrialization transformed American society
and created a large urban middle class and
working class. Cities grew rapidly, swelled both
by internal migration and by the "new"
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.
A mass market emerged, tied to a national
economy. Businesses, separating ownership
from control, became large through horizontal
and vertical integration. Business leaders were
opposed to the rise of the" administrative state,"
which itself was a structural reply to the nature of
rationalized behavior begun by the business
community. 8 As Glenn Porter writes, "The
nation remade itself to accommodate to the
requirements of the modern corporation." 9 It
was not easy for Americans to understand the
nature of the emerging society, and they groped
for new principles of social order in a
nationalized, mechanized, urbanized, and
industrialized set of institutions. In an excellent
summary paragraph, Robert Wiebe suggests the
paradoxical nature of the modern state:
Yet to almost all of the people who created
them, these themes meant only dislocation
and bewilderment. America in the late
nineteenth century was a society without a
core. It lacked those national centers of
authority and information which might
have given order to such swift changes.
American institutions were still oriented
toward a community life where family and
church, education and press, professions
and government, all largely found their
meaning by the way they fit one with
another inside a town or a detached
portion of a city. As men ranged farther and
farther from their communities, they tried
desperately to understand the larger world
in terms of their small, familiar
environment. They tried, on other words,
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to impose the known upon the unknown, to
master an impersonal world through the
customs of a personal society. They failed,
usually without recognizing why; and that
failure to comprehend a society they were
helping to make contained the essence of
the nation's story. 10
In a context of social upheaval, conservative
judges and lawyers thought America to be in a
state of crisis, and they worried deeply about the
stability of society and the rule of law. At the
same time Populists and Progressives were
appealing to the state for intervention on behalf
of those victimized by the same changes. Both
sides were looking to law for the purpose of social
control and stability, but their respective visions
of that stability varied markedly . 11 There was a
"psychic crisis" in the 1890's centered on no less
than two levels of consciousness about the very
meaning of America itself. "In the eyes of those
farmers, laborers and radicals who joined in the
People's Party of the 1890's, America
incorporated represented a misappropriation of
the name. To the Republican Party, swept to
victory in 1896 under William McKinley, it
represented the exact fulfillment of the name." 12
In short, as Alan Trachtenberg asks, was the new
America represented by the World's Columbian
Exposition in Chicago in 1893-called "The
White City" -or was it represented by the blood
and fire of the great railroad strike of 1894? Both
visions of American reality could not be
simultaneously true.
In the 1890's there were concerted attempts to
enact legislation of social order and control. As
Morton Keller writes:
The definition of social status in the late
nineteenth century was intimately linked to
the control of social behavior. ... Social
and economic change gave new force to old
concerns over the threat to public order . ...
The conflict between freedom and
constraint of course predated
industrialism; the coming of a new
economic and social order heightened
rather than resolved that tension. 13
Both in legislation and in judicial decisions, the
period 1890-1920 saw a massive and concerted
attempt to define, or redefine, the status of
persons before the law: immigration was
restricted (Chinese Exclusion Act, JohnsonReed Act); Black participation in American life
was narrowly restricted ("Jim Crow" laws,
Plessy v. Ferguson); Indians were put in their
"place" on reservations (Dawes Act); and family
life, sexuality, and women's rights were

addressed by a legion of laws, regulations, and
. decisions. 14
The belief in the importance of marriage and
family as guarantors of social order was so deeply
felt that areas hitherto untouched by law, and
even unmentioned in public discourse, were now
to be regulated, as witness the anti-abortion laws
passed in most states by 1900. Anti-abortion
policy cannot be seen apart from the general
institutional history of the late 19th century. 15 In a
'generally "free" society before the coming of the
administrative state, Americans had used their
liberty very widely indeed. Throughout the 19th
century abortions were performed, on a national
level, on 25 percent of all pregnancies. Michigan
had a national high of 34 percent. In the
population history of the United States, a
massive shift took place during the 19th century.
In 1810 there were 1,058 children under the age
of five for . every 1,000 white women of
childbearing age. By 1890, it had dropped to 685
per 1,000. In other words, whereas the average
family at the beginning of the century had seven
children, by the end of the century it had three or
four. Contraception alone cannot account for
the steep decline, because birth-control
information was haphazardly distributed and its
methods were marginally effective at best. It
seems that abortion was the main means of
American birth control.
By 1900, most states had some form of antiabortion law in place. The crusaders for these
laws were physicians, not clergy or other moral
reformers, and their crusade should be
understood more in institutional terms than in
moral ones. University-trained doctors, calling
themselves "regulars," banded together in a new
organization, the American Medical Association,
founded in 184 7. They campaigned against the
irregularly trained persons posing as doctors and
against home-remedy-type "folk healers." It was
the latter group which performed most
abortions. The "regulars" believed, rightly as it
turned out, that if they were successful in
criminalizing abortions, they would deprive the
"competition" from a considerable part of its
business and income. As James Mohr notes, in a
most incisive book on the subject, two factors
emerged after 1870 which allowed the AMA, and
its indefatigable leader, Boston doctor Horatio
Storer, to succeed in the campaign to enact antiabortion legislation. Amidst the general
professionalism of America the doctors were
increasingly seen as the only credible group to
deal with health issues. Accompanying this was
the rise of the Republican party, "whose
members were willing to use the powers of the

state, were predisposed to rationalizing and
bureaucratizing public policies of all sorts, and
were very open to the influence and the advice of
professionals and experts." 16 While anti-abortion
policy never became a politically partisan issue, it
was supported by persons who were worried
about the general threat to social order and who
supported both legislation and judicial decisions
which brought social stability. It is in this sense
that historian Gabriel Kolko could assert that the
triumph of ''progressive" legislation was, in a
certain sense, "the triumph of conservatism." 17
In Constitutional and legal terms the "psychic
crisis" of the 1890's, and its result, can best be
seen in the transition on the Supreme Court from
a kind of legal formalism to a new kind of law
called "sociological law." Formalism in law seeks
to perpetuate the law as immune from social
influence, and sociological law accepts social
influence. It is this transition which has vexed and
exercised such contemporary writers on the new
"Christian Right" as John Whitehead, Rousas
Rushdoony, and Francis A. Schaeffer.
Schaeffer finds it intolerable that legal scholars
like Oliver Wendell Holmes should write that
"the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience," and the former Chief Justice
Frederick Vinson should state: "Nothing is more
certain in modern societies than the principle
that there should be no absolutes." 18 Schaeffer's
insight is valuable, but in offering it he loses sight
of the fact that the common law itself was
changing. The best (or worst) example of formal
legal thinking gone mad is the Supreme Court
case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railway Company (1886), the famous case which
allowed large corporations to be declared
"persons" under the meaning of the "due
process" clauses of the 5th and 14th
amendments, and thereby largely freed from
restraint by the "Administrative State." This
doctrine was developed and formalized in Smyth
v. Ames in 1898. It would seem to be the height of
legal formalism, untouched by reality, if the
·Supreme Court cannot distinguish between a
"person" who is a freed slave who needs
protection of his civil rights and a "person" who is
Carnegie Steel Corporation. In fact, even in
"formal" legal thinking, there had already been
an adaptation to social change, as noted above,
when law and the administrative state moved to
create a new pattern of social order in the face of
perceived threat. Indeed, the advent of
"sociological law" does not run to the logical
antithesis of formal law. The acceptance of
materials other than purely legal precedents in
making judicial decisions does not imply that
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precedents are no longer important but that
courts and bureaus must also bring sociological,
economic, medical, or other social-scientific
materials in the decision-making process.
The first major break in formal legal decisions
came in Muller v. Oregon in 1908. Louis D.
Brandeis, then still in private practice, presented
a brief that was accepted by the court in which
both social information and precedent were
heard. Indeed, this did open the way for a new
understanding of law, in which legal formalism
was balanced with extra-legal information.
Under this new style of thinking, many Acts of
Congress were now deemed Constitutional
which in prior times would probably have been
regarded as unconstitutional. In the Pure Food
and Drug Act, the Meat Inspection Act, and even
the morals-related Mann Act, the Court listened
to, and partly based its decision on, extra-legal
information. Under the influence of law
professors such as Roscoe Pound, Oliver
Wen dell Holmes, Thomas Powell, and Felix
Frankfurter, legal formalism was devalued in the
education of lawyers, and by mid-20th century
sociological law was widely accepted. The most
memorable recent example was in the landmark
Supreme Court case, Brown v. The Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) on school
segregation. The lawyers for the Board thought
they had the case won in citing prior precedents,
especially the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). In the end, the
Supreme Court made its decision more on the
basis of the social-psychological information on
the effects of segregation on children than on
prior legal precedent. Despite one's personal
views on whether or not the Court did right in
banning segregation from any legal standing, it
surely allowed the question to be raised which
John Adams voiced long ago: "Is this a
government of laws or of men?"
All parties in the contemporary debate about
the future of America are agreed that an essential
social consensus no longer exists. Conservative
commentators insist that the only way forward is
to admit fully and frankly that we have lost the
mentality which undergirded the work of the
Constitution writers-i.e., that there is such a
thing as the commonweal-and that the whole
discussion of public virtue must take place in a
context in which religious values are formative,
as they were then. The essential thesis of this
article is to affirm that view. But proceeding
further, we must see how and why the mind of
the Constitution was lost. In short, that mind was
lost because of the history of liberty in America.
Community in America was not lost because
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elite groups began to think differently, but
because the American people as a whole began
to behave differently. So before conservative
commentators too quickly savor their intellectual victory, they should be aware of what that
victory will cost them. Most contemporary
conservatives, of course, are really radical
liberals in that they have a foundational belief in
individual liberty and a distrust of a government
which would shape the exercise of that liberty.
Only in America could radical liberals get away
with calling themselves conservatives!
One of the most telling examples of the
contemporary confusion about "liberal" and
"conservative" viewpoints is that about "Right to
Choose" and "Right to Life." Pro-abortionists
believe in liberty, an individual's right to choose,

... the extant lexicon (liberal,
conservative, left, right) contains not only not useful, but
essentially secular distinctions . ..
and, in doing so, stand squarely in the mainline
tradition of the American people who celebrate a
good society as one which gave scope for an ever
expanding liberty. Anti-abortionists do not
believe in liberty because they deplore the result
of the individual's free choice. They say that
community is violated by such liberty, that the
virtue necessary for a commonweal does not
exist. In taking these positions for "choice" and
for "life," many commentators argue at
philosophical cross-purposes, apparently
unaware of the paradoxes and ironies involved.
For example, Jerry Falwell, a noted
antiabortionist, founded a university he insists on
calling "Liberty." I take it that Falwell means to
assert community, so he really should have
named his school "Solidarity" (or perchance
"Commonweal") University. It is functional
nonsense for someone to look out on the
disarray of contemporary America and say
"liberty has failed, give us more liberty." Similarly
Francis Schaeffer, who did more than any other
person to make anti-abortion a Christian issue,
was confused about law and liberty. 19 He
believed that the reason for the abortion crisis
is the prior acceptance of sociological law. The
irony here is that under immanent law
throughout the 19th century there were millions

of abortions, but it is only through instrumental
law that states criminalized abortion in a desire
for social control. To be sure, he is correct in
believing that the recriminalizing of abortion in
our time would restore the foundational beliefs of
the founding, and Constitutional, generation of
Americans, but it would do so in self-conscious
rejection of the main American cultural belief in
an ever expanding liberty.
It would seem that we need some new ways of
talking about our current problems because the
extant lexicon (liberal, conservative, left, right)
contains not only not useful, but essentially
secular distinctions, which should not define the
work of Christian writers. Richard John
Neuhaus helps from a new basis for discussion
by speaking of the arena for the commonweal as
"the public square. " 20 The public square, the
forum for public discourse and the place where
the American consensus was formed, was once
"clothed" with the conviction that public
attitudes and policies were, and ought to be,
informed by religious values. In Neuhaus' view,
that public square has in the past half-century
become "naked," both because a "new class" of
elite thinkers has asserted and assumed that
American society is now secular and because the
courts have pressed relentlessly the
Constitutional requirement of the separation of
church and state to ends which the writers of the
Constitution and the majority of the American
people never intended. In putting the argument
in this ingenious way, Neuhaus caused his
readers rise above the conventiona 1 wisdom
positions of left and right. He is critical of
"mainline-liberalism" and of the politicized
"sectarianism" of fundamentalist evangelicalism.
Very much in the Niebuhrian mold of "Christian
realism," he calls for a new "third way" which
equally rejects the vacuousness of religious
liberalism's embrace of modernity and the
absolutism of the moral majoritarians' desperate
clinging to a monist culture of a white Protestant
hegemony.
A. James Reichley further expands our new
ways of talking about the subject we all want to
redefine, the role of religion in American life. 21
Reichley insists on what by now must be seen as
a starting place for redefinition-Le., that
whatever Americans might mean by the
establishment clause in the Constitution, the
founding generation and the majority of
Americans since then have believed that the
functional separation of church and state in no
way excludes the notion that religious values
should guide and support government in the
American republic. He calls his prescription for

good government "theistic humanism," which
indicates a commitment to the ordering of
human life in accountability to transcendent
truth.
Robert Bellah and his associates have written
what I believe to be both the best analysis of the
American malaise and the best prescription for
recovering the lost consensus. 22 They invoke the
analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville, whose
Democracy in America (1835, 1840) may be the
best and most enduring work about America.
Tocqueville hoped that America would succeed,
both for itself, but also as an example to the
world. Yet, he warned, the race was on between
the vitality of liberty's possibilities and the
decadence of liberty's excess. He believed that
Americans need not go all the way to the anarchy
toward which the logic of their liberty tended.
Rather, liberty would be safeguarded by certain
"givens" -most notably "the equality of
condition"-in the context of a consensual
community. Bellah and his associates see
decadence winning over vitality.
A decadent America is not so much
reprehensible as pitiable. The Americans to be
pitied in Bellah's work are not the oppressed and
out-groups, but the winners and holders of the
American Dream. The people who form the basis
for Bellah's study are those who, in one definition
or another, are successful. They are winners but
they are not fulfilled. The American ideal of
liberty has propelled them on their way. But
where has it brought, or left, them? (Here one
thinks of Whitman in "Facing West From
California's Shores," saying, "Where is what I
started for so long ago, and why is it yet
unfound?")
The main reason that Americans are
unfulfilled, even in their success, is they have lost
even the way of expressing themselves in
culture, with a language to disclose real human
needs. Bellah et al. make the very important
point about the "two languages" Americans
speak. The first language reflects the prevailing
ideology of individualism, of which there are two
types: utilitarian individualism, related to jobs
and consumption; and expressive individualism,
related to psychological fulfillment, spoken in the
jargon of psychotherapy. The prevailing
American ideology says that the most fulfilled
person is the unemcumbered autononomous
self, but down deep in the unspoken affective,
people know, or feel, that that just is so. Bellah
reminds us that there is a second language, deep
in cultural memory, now nearly lost, in which
Americans express themselves in terms of their
callings and commitments, both for the self and
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for society. Bellah calls these older patterns of
dis.c ourse republican and biblical. The authentic
self, in this language, sees itself as anchored in a
"community of memory," related to much more
than our jobs, leisure, or the pursuit of the
"unencumbered self." Bellah and his associates
believe that it is only in the recovery of biblical
and republican language that Americans can
recover a sense of what to say in "the public
square."
So the message, after all, is recovery of the lost
heritage. One might ask: "Isn't this just an
academically respectable version of what the
moral majoritarians are calling for in a less
articulate way?" No, it is not. Bellah recognizes,
as we all must, that the world we have lost is lost
indeed. There is no way to "return to religion" in
the manner advocated by reconstructionists.
That world is unrecoverable because the
structures which brought our modern world into
being cannot now be unstructured. And a
restoration of the monist world of the Protestant
"righteous empire" would be worse still. We
must somehow make do with the modern nature
of our society and especially with its pluralistic
character. But just because we cannot see the
way to restore the former community, we must
not conclude that we can do nothing at all.
Recovering the mind behind biblical and republic
language can help us to re-achieve that lost
balance between the dual imperatives of
society-in short, the one and the many-which
was present in the American consensus before
liberty broke it apart. It is with this reestablished
consensus that Americans might see the way
forward, and that they can go on. They would
recover the habit of heart, a deep conviction in
the unspoken affective, that causes them to walk
with confidence into the future because they
remember how far they have come together in
those two hundred years since the Founders
gave them a document which would endow them
with the blessings of liberty.
■
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Christina
by Mike Rubingh

Dear Christina,
Your letter was uplifting. Thank you for writing, but why now-after so long? It's strange; I
was thinking about you just before your letter
came. Really you had no reason to write at all,
after what I did. She's gone now, by the way. So
... it's been awhile. I don't know what to say,
really. Three years is a long time; some things
change but others stay the same. It's that time of
year again-springtime; the magnolias are
starting to bloom, and it's hurricane weather:
(Guinevere, perhaps, is coming soon). I still
distinctly remember you standing under the
magnolias at the airport holding onto your white
hat with the red ribbon about the same time of
year in '84. I remember the smell; was it your
perfume or perhaps the lilacs, or just the tight
magnolia buds? I have that picture here, in fact.
I've gathered all the old pictures I could find and
put them in the gaudy old cookie tin your mother
gave us the time we went canoeing. I should be
more careful with them; the edges of some are
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getting bent and smudged. I was surprised to find
this particular one in my briefcase, though, when
I opened it to get out my latest project. It must've
fallen between the pages of "Data Encapsulation
for Expert Systems." I'm making quite a name for
myself, especially just a single year out of Georgia
Tech. I look out over Atlanta from here as ifl own
the city. She is beautiful from 17 stories up. Only
sometimes I wish I could let the wind in; I feel like
I'm suffocating at times-one of the hazards of
computer programming-where you begin to
feel like the computer screen is an abyss engulfing you and your heart becomes synchronized to
that little blinking cursor. I'm looking out my
window now .. .I wonder if I could break it? It's
made of thick plexiglass with little silver filaments
inside the edges. I have a strange impulse to
make those little Y-shaped paper helicopters
weighted down by paperclips, like when we were
kids, and drop them 17 stories to the street. I
always wanted to write a message on one of
those, so that someone could find it and read it
and fall in love with me. I used to wonder too:
would people twirl like that if they fell from so

high up? I see some newly-planted magnolias
along the front of the bank below. Some are
blooming. They look like little girls in pink
dresses.
How is school going? It was shocking to hear
you're contemplating seminary. What on earth's
got into you?; you never seemed the theological
type to me. No, I can't imagine going to a class
where one learns about predestination, I can't
imagine even talking about it with friends. How
could God be so inhuman? It's ridiculous. I suppose they practice infant baptism too! Actually,
I've decided the world would be a much better
place if human beings would just be more
tolerant. I've met more decent, respectable, productive people outside the church than inside. I
haven't been gqing much lately, I haven't been
very spirit-filled. I'm so busy. Religion is a burden
right now, one I don't want to carry. If I'm not a
lapsed Baptist, I'm at least a relaxed one. They
seem happy with me at church as long as I tithe a
gentlemanly sum and don't smoke or drink. And
these, of course, are already part of my lifestyle.
Jerry isn't as bad as some out there, but he has

the same tendencies. Look at Oral Roberts, Jim
and Tammy Bakker, Gospelgate. Too many of
them are hypocrites, and if there's one thing I
don't want to be it's a hypocrite, Christina. I wish
you could come home more often; you don't
know what you're missing. I'll be getting a BMW
in two-and-a-half weeks-echt Deutsch-no
more of these Japanese emasculates for me. We
could go riding in the springtime, crank down the
windows, bring along my black Lab, Dante, who
would enjoy the wind in his fur as much as I. We
could head out for a ritzy place, the beach, anywhere ....
I hope you aren't too bored up there in
Michigan. It sounds terrible-to be a blonde
among 4,000 other blondes-when down here
-you were as rare as an ivory-billed woodpecker.
My lunch break is over, so I've got to get back to
work. Sorry I spilled the cream on page one.
Evening. Thinking about old times makes me ·
wish you were here, Christina. Strangely, I'm
always less sure about the course my life is taking
at night. I usually work or go out with Madeline,
but tonight I'm alone. You'd like Madeline; she's
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a fine woman, a true southern belle who's been
urbanized. We make a good-looking couple.
Yesterday we went to the symphony to hear two
of my favorites: Brahms and Bruckner. Remember the time we rigged two pairs of headphones
to your little Walkman and listened to Dvorak's
"New World" until the batteries ran out? I have it
by Sir George Solti and the CSO on CD if you
ever get the urge to listen when you come home.
Sad music .. .I mean it ended on the sad part:
"Goin' home" -the old spiritual our maid used to
sing on rainy summer nights.
I've been watching the clock and time is
melting away like that Salvador Dali painting. It's
hard for me to write what I've been thinking; it
seems so nostalgic and womanish. But -1 had a
few gin and tonics, and if my hand still retains the
capacity to make readable letters, I will get this
irrational catharsis over with. By now I am
acquainted with at least the late evening, and I
feel hollow, like the peal of a gong or a canoe
paddle glancing off an aluminum stern. I've been
looking at old pictures ever since I put the
magnolia picture back, and I've seen more
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trees-warlock pines and haunting cypresses.
I've been remembering our strange trip into the
heart of the swamp in vivid detail, and it haunts
me.
You remember the utter recklessness of it all,
don't you: how we set out with Hershey bars and
marshmallows, grandma's cookies, a canteen of
fresh water, a camera, and a notebook? As if that
weren't dangerous enough, we left with the
foolish romantic-souled intention of withstanding hurricane Faith together. I remember the
curious quietness before the storm: the scream
of a hawk far away, the noiseless slide of alligators into the tannin-black water. We reached
the comparative safety of the island and
grounded the canoe just as the storm grew
potent. Giddy with weather and overdosed on
oxygen, we talked louder and louder as the storm
increased, yelled, screamed inanities at each
other until almost delirious we began to wrestle in
the wind and the rain and the quackgrass. A
facefull of wet, sharp weeds, a little blood on my
lip. Your hands clenched around my neck,
strong thighs on my back until I countered,

laughing, pulling you forward and rolling. The ·
rain pasting our hair to our scalps, the strength in
my arms overpowering yours finally, until on top
of you with the hurricane behind me and pounding in my head, I looked into those eyes.
"No." they said: a single word in utter calmness. Ashamed, I sat down beside you marvelling
that the storm had suddenly stilled, looking up to
see stars again overhead, watched them go
reeling across the sky. We were together in the
eye, the center. Later we crawled out of the
gigantic cypress in whose hollow core we had
wedged ourselves in refuge for the remainder of
the storm. You stood up, a cypress knee tripped
you, legs crumpled, and you sat there in the mud,
laughing. We found the canoe overturned, but
with only a single cross-hatched dent in the side.
We found the marshmallows under the canoe, a
little soggy, but delicious; we ate them for the
sugar. Taking out the flashlight, I flipped on the
bright beam and discovered that the log behind
us was a 14-foot alligator, lying stunned. We left
in haste, but paddled back leisurely in the
darkness, peculiarly lighthearted, with only a

flashlight to guide us.
Christina, what I want to know before I pass
out tonight is this: what did you find that night
. that I didn't? What did you think or feel inside the
still point of that hurricane? I need to know. Was
it for real? Did all this happen, or did I just dream
it once too often? I'm not sure anymore; the line
between fantasy and reality is so vague. You had
a secret, something deep inside you, something
pure and inviolate that you wouldn't reveal to me,
and I couldn't touch. Why did you say no
Christina? I'm burning to find out. Why was I so
happy in such terrible .circumstances, so happy
to be different? What did your eyes see in the
eye? I only saw stars, and now I'm more confused
than ever. I want to see you again. I'm seeing
stars now-green and blue ones inside my eyelids; my writing would fail a policeman's straightline test. My Southern Comfort is almost gone.
I'm counting sheep to fall asleep. .counting
sheep jumping over the stars.
Cal
4/7/87 -Burn this letter.
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GOING HOME
Through the large bus window
we watch the neon-studded sunsetthe old Indian and I we speed past lit factories
st ill billowing smoke from their stacks.
He laughs,
sp its,
and says how, before he came to El Paso,
he never knew factor ies ran all night.
We ta lk over the noisy eng in e
and he te ll s me
he's going back to the desertfor good.
He says Indians don't last long in the c ity,
moccasins fa ll apart too fast on hard pavement.
I look down , through the dark,
at his feet.
He laughs aga in
and sticks his f ing er
through a hole in his leather so les.
After Truth or Consequencesin the middle of nowherehe asks the bus driver to let him off.
I cram a sandw ich and half a candy bar
into his hand.
He smiles
and t ips his black fe lt hat
releasing his lon g hair
to fa ll across his face .
As the bus pulls away,
I watch him close his jacket t ight
against the January chill,
and I hope his feet don't freeze
before he makes it home.
-Becky Tempest
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THE RESORT ACROSS THE POND
Gravity, at this remove,
is not a major force.
I write her letters, write "I love
you." She writes "weak," or worse.
I use the phone. I spin my line
and hope to turn her head:
"Be mine." She scans the bait and then
guffaws. The lirie goes dead.
Telekinesis doesn't work,
my thoughts reach someone elseinvariably a working bloke
somewhere outside York Mills.
Calvin Sem's the only way
remaining now, I hear.
"Masters of Divinity":
they make them over there.
- Tom VanM illigen
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______Meditation·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - My grandmother is lying helplessly in the bed of a rest home. For the past year she has been suffering the
turmoils of cancer and will soon taste death. Quite frankly, I am uncertain of what I am supposed to think
and feel at this time. Surely I have the knowledge that my grandmother will be free from all suffering, pain
and anxiety when she makes the transition from this world into the everlasting one, and surely I can rest in
the sweet consolation of her eternal redemption. Yet I cannot deny my own feelings of fear and sadness. I
cannot deny that I was anticipating a great loss. Each time the phone rings my entire being freezes in
expectation of the grim news.
Why am I unable to be overcome with the profound joy and relief a believer should experience at the
time of another's death? "She'll be so much happier," I've always heard. But what about those of us who
are left behind, and for whom this will be the darkest moment? We are losing the one who loved us so
selflessly and who scolded us for having one too many of her ice-box cookies or too much of her
strawberry jam on a single piece of bread: "You've got enough jam on there for six!" she would say.
Perhaps I am simply too selfish to find peace and contentment in my anticipated loss. Is this also why I'll
undeniably need comfort at the time of her death? But did not Christ himself need to be comforted at the
death of his friend Lazarus? And did he not also pray tearfully in Gethsemane that his own life be spared if it
be his Father's will?
.
My Father's will. From this phrase I derive all of my comfort. For it is my Father's will that my grandmother be restored to perfection and taken home to live forever in immortality and supreme blessedness.
It is my Father's will that I bid her adieu, knowing that the greatest joy awaits her. I would not encourage her
now to rage against the dying of this earthly light, for soon she will be face to face with our Creator, and will
dwell in the eternal light of His countenance.
-Lisa Van Houten
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